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Petitioner/Appellant Richard Mendoza hereby files this Reply Brief which is 
intended to demonstrate that the arguments made in the Brief of Appellee are unavailing 
and that he is entitled to the relief sought in his appeal. 
The fundamental fallacy with the argument that the Appellees filed a Motion for 
Review within the applicable thirty (30) day deadline from the Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge is that the Appellee misstates the Order which it should have 
appealed. The Course of Proceedings set forth in the Statement of Facts in the Brief of 
Appellee at pages 3 through 7 demonstrates that this is the case. The Appellee acts as if 
the operative order was issued on February 28, 2005. That is false. The Order which the 
Appellee failed timely to Appeal is the Supplemental and Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order ("Supplemental Order") (R., 57-60), which set forth the 
rights of Appellant and from which the Appellee failed to file its Appeal to the Labor 
Commission within thirty (30) days. The operative order, which sets forth the 
Appellant's rights was issued on February 8, 2005. That would have required an Appeal 
within thirty (30) days if Appellee wished to challenge it before the Labor Commission. 
Yet, Appellee admits it did not file its Motion for Review to the Labor Commission until 
March 30, 2005, fifty (50) days after the Administrative Law Judge's Supplemental 
Order was entered. 




a. His medical costs related to his industrial accident, 
except that he was awarded no compensation for the DRS 
traction therapy; 
b. Temporary total compensation in the amount of 
$51,005; 
c. $6,705 in consideration of his 7% whole person 
impairment related to the industrial accident as permanent 
partial disability compensation; 
d. Interest at 8% from the time the medical costs and 
wage compensation payments were due until paid. (R., 60). 
That award, is, in essence, what the Appellee appealed from on March 30, 2005, 
when it finally filed its Motion for Review to the Labor Commission. 
Appellee argues that there would be a windfall for Appellant, because on the 
merits he is not entitled to such an award. Aside from Appellant's disagreement with that 
characterization, that argument is immaterial to this appeal because the question here is 
one of jurisdiction, jurisdiction of the Labor Commission to review the Supplemental 
Order. 
In Gillett v. Price, 135 P.3d 861 (Utah 2006), the Utah Supreme Court noted with 
respect to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that post-judgment motions to reconsider are 
not recognized in the Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore held that a Motion for 
Reconsideration cannot toll the time period allowed for appeal. Likewise, that same 
reasoning must lead this Court to find that there is no tolling of the thirty (30) day appeal 
period to the Labor Commission caused by the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. 
Indeed, as Appellee admits in its Brief, it is well settled under Utah law that a Motion for 
Review must be filed within thirty (30) days from the ALJ's Order. [Brief of Appellee at 
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11]. Appellee further admits that it "is not aware of any current statute or rule in Utah 
that currently addresses whether a party may file a Motion for Reconsideration of ALJ's 
Orders". [Id.] While Motions for Review were "previously" permitted pursuant to prior 
Utah statute (§35-1-82.53, Utah Code Ann. 1987), that prior statute is, according to 
Appellee's own admission, not currently effective. 
The Appellee, despite attempts at basing its rights on §34A-2-420, fails, as it must, 
to point to any statute allowing a Motion for Review or Reconsideration to the 
Administrative Law Judge to toll the thirty (30) day deadline set for an Appeal to the 
Labor Commission. Thus, the failure to Appeal to the Labor Commission within thirty 
(30) days, as admittedly required by Utah statute, is fatal to Appellee's argument, and no 
Utah statute permits the Labor Commission to take jurisdiction of an Appeal if it is not 
filed within thirty (30) days of the Order. 
Only by mischaracterizing the February 28, 2005 Order regarding Motion for 
Reconsideration as the operative order can the Appellee even attempt to make its 
argument. To honor this argument would be tantamount to honoring an argument that 
despite the dictates of Gillett a Motion for Reconsideration in a civil court would toll the 
thirty (30) day deadline to appeal. 
Appellee argues that its letter dated February 14, 2005 to the Honorable Dale 
Sessions, the Administrative Law Judge (R., 61-62), may be considered a Motion for 
Review to the Commission. [Brief of Appellee at 8, 10]. However, this letter was 
addressed solely to Judge Sessions, was called a "Motion for Reconsideration and/or 
Motion for Review to Supplement and Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
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and Order" dated February 8, 2005 (R., 61), and asked only Judge Sessions to amend the 
February 8, 2005 Supplemental Order. (R., 62). Appellee well recognizes that this was 
not an appeal to the Commission but was rather a Motion for Reconsideration. When 
Appellee finally got around to an appeal on March 30, 2005, it called the document 
MOTION FOR REVIEW, and rather than send it as a letter to the Administrative Law 
Judge, it filed it with the Labor Commission of Utah. (R., 66-69). A mere glance at the 
letter sent to Administrative Law Judge Sessions on February 14, 2005 (R., 61-62) on the 
one hand, and the Motion for Review, captioned Richard Mendoza Petitioner vs. Skaggs 
Companies, Inc., and/or CNA Respondents, in the Labor Commission of Utah (R., 66-
69), demonstrates plainly that the February 14, 2005 letter was a Motion for 
Reconsideration filed with the Administrative Law Judge as opposed to a Motion for 
Review to the Labor Commission. 
Therefore, it is uncontrovertable that the Appeal of the February 8, 2005 Order to 
the Labor Commission was not filed even close to the thirty (30) day deadline. 
Finally, Skaggs seems to talk about the custom at the Labor Commission to allow 
Administrative Law Judges to reconsider and amend their orders. While this may go on, 
it cannot and does not toll the thirty (30) day time period for appeals of orders. Utah 
statutes do not allow for such a tolling, and custom cannot allow an administrative 
agency to violate or ignore a statutory scheme. 
Nor does the Labor Commission rule cited by Appellee provide for such a tolling 
in this case. Rule R602-2(M) provides: 
M. Motions for Review. 
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\ny party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtain 
review of an Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge by 
filing a written request for review with the Adjudication 
Division in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-46b-
12 and Section 34A-1-303, Utah Code. Unless a request for 
review is properly filed, the Administrative Law Judge's 
Order is the final order of the Commission. If a request for 
review is filed, other parties to the adjudicative proceeding 
may file a response within 20 calendar days of the date the 
request for review was filed. If such a response is filed, the 
party filing the original request for review may reply within 
10 calendar days of the date the response was filed. 
Thereafter the Administrative Law Judge shall; 
a. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after 
holding such further hearing and receiving such further 
evidence a? mav be deemed nece^sarv 
b . AiiK-i.w . .»iw*;.:> ,.M , ; . . . . . . : . * , . • . „ .Mippiei i iCi iLi l 
Order; or 
t\ Relet* the entire case for review under Section 34A 2-
801, Utah C< >de; 
2. ii the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental 
Order, as provided in this subsection, it shall be final unless a 
request for review of the same is filed, (emphasis added) 
Rule K(>0J. 4J\[), il il allows sin Ii ,i Irllm/1, ',•, ,'iiM MTIII In b kyun l III" ' "ifirmv i"11'^  
powers under Utah statutes and could not pass legal muster. But, by its terms, 602-2(M) 
cannot possibly have any applicability to this case. The only allowance for an 
Ailiiiiiiislialivn I  AV lndj',t In u'opeii a HIM11 and coin a siipplriiu'nliil inula mieml m 
modify his prior by a supplemental order or uo any him; else undei this rule is, "[I]f a 
request for review is T«>» .I ^ ? " fher parties to the adjudicative proceeding may file a 
reSp0nse w i t h i n 20 cu icnua i uayb ut ijis._sl.aic. niu I H J U I M iOl i^ WOVv w<us i l k d 
case, after Appellee's 1 -cbrucu •* ! 1, _^ 0i>3 toller to the V^LJ asking him u reconsider, no 
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other party filed a response to that letter. Therefore, §602-2(M), even if it were allowed 
by Utah statute, did not come into play. 
Finally, even if an Administrative Law Judge can review, revise and amend his or 
her orders, that does not mean that the thirty (30) day time period is tolled. A party who 
seeks review to an Administrative Law Judge and fails to ask for review by the 
Commission within thirty (30) days, does so at that party's peril. 
For the reasons set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief and in this Brief, and 
because of the statutory scheme in Utah for review of Orders of Utah Labor Commission 
Administrative Law Judges, it is plain that the Labor Commission's review of the 
Supplemental Order was done without jurisdiction. The terms of the Supplemental Order 
dated February 8, 2005 (R., 57-60) must be reinstated, with all the relief given Appellant 
therein reinstated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this t ^ d a y of January, 2007. 
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